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1. Summary of Evidence
1.1 This evidence submission focuses on the perspective of one European Union (EU) 
member state, the Republic of Ireland, regarding future reform of the EU and the extent to 
which the Irish Government shares the UK Government’s vision for the future of Europe. 
1.2 Viewing a British exit from the European Union as a ‘major strategic risk’ for Ireland, the 
Irish are strong supporters of continued UK membership of the EU and hence sympathetic 
to the UK Government’s renegotiation efforts.2 The Irish Government is broadly supportive 
of three of the main objectives of the UK’s membership renegotiation, namely enhancing 
competitiveness, sovereignty and subsidiarity and a formal setting out of the relationship 
between those within and outside the Eurozone as outlined by Prime Minister David 
Cameron in his Chatham House speech and letter to European Council President Donald 
Tusk. On proposed welfare reform, however, the Irish Government is more cautious given 
existing links between the two countries on freedom of movement and workers’ rights. 
2. Ireland’s perspective on EU membership and the purpose of European integration
2.1. Ireland’s decision to join the European Economic Community (EEC) was largely an 
economic one. Heavily dependent on UK trade, in 1973 EEC membership offered Irish 
industry the opportunity to modernise and diversify further into new markets, as well as 
clear benefits for the agricultural sector through the Common Agricultural Policy.3 From the 
outset Irish participation in European integration had as a main aim the achievement and 
securing of Irish prosperity. 
2.2. In addition, participation in European integration was seen as an opportunity to 
modernise socially, politically and culturally. As a small state in a globalised world, EU 
membership was and still is seen as an enhancer of national sovereignty. In spite of (and 
perhaps also because of) recent economic difficulties resulting from the fall-out of the 
financial crisis, Ireland’s membership of the EU continues to be viewed as broadly beneficial 
by the public and a strong commitment to EU membership underpins governmental action.4 
For the Irish Government Irish prosperity is closely bound up with the opportunities and 
advantages of membership of the EU, particularly as realised through the single market, and 
membership of the Eurozone is viewed as key to underpinning Irish financial stability.5 
3. The Irish view of Britain’s EU membership
3.1. As outlined in the recent Foreign Policy White Paper, The Global Island: Ireland’s 
Foreign Policy for a Changing World, Britain’s continued membership of the EU is seen as of 
vital national interest to Ireland.6 Indeed, for the Irish it is extremely important that other 
EU member states recognise that Ireland has an important stake in the outcome of the 
negotiations given its unique historical ties with Britain and shared land frontier.7 
23.2. For Ireland, a British exit from the EU would be seen to have significant negative 
consequences for Ireland’s economy,8 potentially negative implications for the political 
settlement in Northern Ireland and the loss of an important ally in EU negotiations.9 It is in 
this context that Taoiseach Enda Kenny and other government ministers have signalled their 
willingness to support the UK government in its reform agenda as part of its EU membership 
renegotiation on numerous occasions, emphasising at the same time that any reforms 
agreed must be consistent with Ireland’s interests in the wider EU. In this respect the UK’s 
EU reform agenda is seen as an accommodation of national concerns (similar to the 
situations in Ireland following the referendum rejections of the Nice and Lisbon treaties in 
2001 and 2008). In other words, it is understood as a British reform agenda rather than an 
EU reform agenda per se. In terms of a broader debate on the future of Europe, in Ireland 
EU reform is debated in the context of future reforms to European economic and monetary 
governance (e.g. the proposals of the Five Presidents’ Report). 
4. Competitiveness 
4.1 The UK Government wants to see a greater focus on efforts to boost competitiveness, 
growth and employment creation in the European Union. The Irish Government is strongly 
supportive of this goal, in particular of enhancing the single market, particularly in services, 
digital and also to a certain degree in energy. The TTIP negotiations were launched under 
the Irish EU Presidency in 2013 and as a highly globalised economy dependent on 
international trade, the Irish strongly support completion of trade agreements with the US, 
Japan and other developed economies in Asia and South America, in line with the European 
Commission’s new Trade Strategy launched in October 2015.10 The Irish labour market is 
already very flexible and the Irish Government also backs the REFIT and Better Regulation 
agendas, and in that context the enhancement of frameworks that reduce regulatory 
burdens on businesses. In sum, the Irish Government’s interests strongly chime with British 
priorities on these issues. 
5. Sovereignty 
5.1 On the question of sovereignty, there are two main issues under discussion: ‘ever closer 
union (of peoples)’ and the enhancement of powers of national parliaments in EU decision-
making. The Irish electorate has voted in nine EU-related referendums since 1972. ‘Ever 
closer union’ as concept has different meanings in different member states and while it has 
not been the explicit focus of contention in Irish referendum campaigns, further political 
integration in European security and defence has been contested due to Ireland’s policy of 
military neutrality. Given the flexibility Ireland already exercises as part of its EU 
membership,11 the Irish would not have difficulty with formal recognition of the specificities 
of Britain’s relationship with the EU, including its views on ‘ever closer union’ as they 
currently exist. 
5.2 While the Irish parliament’s engagement with European Union policy-making has 
increased significantly in recent years, parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation is relatively 
weak in comparative terms. Factors such as a powerful executive, a lack of resources, a 
heavy emphasis on constituency work for Irish MPs and limited visibility have mitigated 
against a more active role and the Irish Parliament’s take-up of the new powers granted to 
national parliaments with the Treaty of Lisbon has been relatively limited.12 It could be said 
that an enhanced role for national parliaments is not a key priority or high on the agenda of 
3the Irish Government. In the 2011 Coalition Programme for Government pledged to put in 
place systems ‘to ensure that Ministers do not bypass the Oireachtas (Parliament) and make 
decisions in Brussels on EU matters before these matters are subjected to scrutiny by the 
Oireachtas’, i.e. a binding scrutiny reserve system. This has yet to be implemented.13 
5.3 Nevertheless, the Joint Oireachtas Committee on European Affairs has signalled that it is 
open to the idea of enhancing the role of national parliaments in the pre-legislative phase of 
EU decision-making as developed in the Treaty of Lisbon, possibly under an enhanced yellow 
card system with new thresholds for activation of such cards and changes to time periods 
for consultation, as well as the enhancement of mechanisms for further cooperation 
amongst national parliaments.14 The preference at this juncture would be for any new 
reforms to be achieved in the first instance by inter-institutional agreement rather than 
through treaty change.
6. Relationship between Eurozone and Non-Eurozone countries
6.1 Ireland was a founding participant in the European Monetary System (EMS) set up in 
1979. Since then it has remained at the heart of economic and monetary integration in the 
EU as a founder member of the Eurozone. While Ireland’s decision to participate in the EMS 
was based on a desire to move away from the link with sterling and enter a strong European 
exchange rate regime, it also had a political dimension, the desire to be a constructive 
player at the heart of moves towards further European integration.15 The decision to join 
the single currency had a similarly political dimension.16 Following the financial crisis of 2008 
and its 2010 bailout, the Irish government’s priority was to regain economic sovereignty 
through exiting the EC/ECB/IMF programme and securing economic recovery. The 
importance of Ireland’s membership of the Eurozone was amplified in this context. There is 
strong public support for the Euro in Ireland.17 That said, the Irish are mindful of British 
concerns in this area and would support the setting out of parameters for the relationship 
between member states within and outside the Eurozone that respect the positions of both 
sets of member states, as has been achieved with the Banking Union legislation. The Irish 
would be alert to the dangers of caucusing in this area but would also have reservations 
over the use of safeguard mechanisms such as ‘emergency brakes’ by non-Eurozone 
members to block proposed legislation deemed to favour the Eurozone over others.  
7. Addressing Migration and Welfare
7.1 The close ties between Ireland and the UK are underpinned by a long history of 
migratory flows between the two countries, which post-independence took place through 
the Common Travel Area arrangement.18 Migrant flows between Ireland and the UK 
continue to be strong with approximately 400,000 Irish citizens currently living in the UK and 
UK nationals making up the second largest group of non-Irish nationals in Ireland (almost 
230,000 British-born people live in Ireland according to the 2011 Census).19 Ireland’s 
experience of inward migration is relatively recent and reached a peak following the 
opening of its labour market to the new EU member states who joined in 2004. During the 
economic crisis, immigration declined significantly and the phenomenon of emigration 
returned as many Irish left the country for better opportunities abroad. While the number 
of Irish emigrating is now falling, it remains high, in spite of improved economic 
performance and falls in unemployment. The UK continues to be the most popular 
4destination for emigrants of all nationalities leaving Ireland, the majority of those being in 
the 25-44 age bracket.20 
7.2 In the context of this close connection, the demand that as EU migrants, Irish citizens 
could also be denied in-work benefits as exist within the British system of social security, 
such as tax credits and housing benefit, for a period of four years would be viewed with 
alarm in Dublin, given long-standing historical reciprocity in certain welfare provision which 
pre-dates EU accession. The challenge thus is how to reconcile this demand with the 
fundamental principle within the EU’s single market that workers should not be 
discriminated against on grounds of nationality and at the same time address Irish-UK 
bilateral sensitivities on this issue. 
7.3 While immigration as an issue is nowhere near as high on the list of public concerns in 
Ireland compared with the UK,21 a recent public opinion poll in Ireland pointed to one 
potential area of agreement between London and Dublin over welfare reforms: 70% of 
those polled were in favour of ending child benefit payments to migrants’ children who 
stayed in their home country.22 Such a change could potentially be made through a revision 
for example of Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
coordination of social security systems (subject to co-decision) for instance.
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